Experiment
Adversarial red-team pilots
A pilot series that attacks my own agents and tools with prompt injection, authorization bypass, and misinformation — while substituting synthetic write results so the red-team harness cannot cause the action it is testing.
Who it is for — and why
Teams evaluating agent red-teaming who need to see completed attacks, harness failures, provider refusals, and real cost reported as separate outcomes.
What was verified
- The harness captures the target's decision to call a write tool and substitutes a synthetic result — it never forwards the call
- The one pilot that does execute runs against a local instance only, with the caller identity fixed outside the model's reach
- Vendor telemetry and result upload are both disabled explicitly rather than left at their defaults
- Every pilot run is logged with its real token cost
Limits
- Several configured vulnerability combinations never completed; those are recorded as harness limitations, not counted as passes
- Pass rates come from a handful of combinations per pilot — far too few to be a security assurance
- It is a pilot series, not a standing gate in a pipeline
- The repository is private because it describes my own attack surface
Access and evidence
Related evidence →Source remains private; the public-safe evidence is linked above.